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Security Consideration For Deep Learning-Based Image Forensics
Wei ZHAO†a), Pengpeng YANG†b), Nonmembers, Rongrong NI†c),Member, Yao ZHAO†d),
and Haorui WU†e), Nonmembers
SUMMARY Recently, image forensics community has paid attention to
the research on the design of effective algorithms based on deep learning
technology. And facts proved that combining the domain knowledge of
image forensics and deep learning would achieve more robust and better
performance than the traditional schemes. Instead of improving algorithm
performance, in this paper, the safety of deep learning based methods in the
field of image forensics is taken into account. To the best of our knowledge,
this is a first work focusing on this topic. Specifically, we experimentally
find that the method using deep learning would fail when adding the slight
noise into the images (adversarial images). Furthermore, two kinds of
strategys are proposed to enforce security of deep learning-based methods.
Firstly, a penalty term to the loss function is added, which is the 2-norm
of the gradient of the loss with respect to the input images, and then an
novel training method is adopt to train the model by fusing the normal and
adversarial images. Experimental results show that the proposed algorithm
can achieve good performance even in the case of adversarial images and
provide a safety consideration for deep learning-based image forensics.
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1. Introduction
With the rapid development of network technology and the
popularity of digital cameras, images have become a impor-
tant information carrier. At the same time, with widespread
use of image editing tools, the authenticity and integrity of
images are greatly challenged. Some people use these tools
to tamper with images maliciously, which can make a series
of negative impacts on the society, especially in the field
of news, military, business and judicial expertise. For ex-
ample, some attackers use tampered images for military or
political purpose, which can cause a crisis of confidence.
Therefore, digital image forensics technologies arise at the
historic moment for verifying the authenticity of images.
In the past decade, a number of algorithms have been
proposed in image forensic community. In particular, meth-
ods based on deep learning play an important role due
to its excellent performance. Yang et .al[1] proposed the
laplacian convolutional neural networks to detect recap-
tured images. Kang et .al[2] combined convolutional neu-
ral networks(CNN) and MFR to deal with median filtering
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forensics and Tang et .al[3] improved its performance using
MFNet. For source camera identification, the schemes using
deep learning have also been proposed in these works[4-
7]. Barni et .al[8] used three kinds of CNN architecture:
CNN in the pixel domain, CNN in noise domain, and CNN
embedding DCT histograms, to detect double JPEG com-
pressed images. In addition, Bayar et.al[9] presented a deep
learning approach for universal image manipulation detec-
tion. Of special interest is that the above algorithms have
better performance than the traditional methods.
Despite superior performance of deep learning-based
methods, there lies a security threat: adversarial examples.
According to the reports[10-15], a deep learning model can
get an error output with high confidence for the input data
with added slightly noise(adversarial examples). For this
phenomenon, there has been no comments so far from the
image forensics community. However, the safety of deep-
learning methods should be be considered, otherwise it will
cause serious consequences. For example, recaptured image
forensic can effectively resist the face presentation attack.
If the deep learning-based recaptured image detection algo-
rithms is easily misleaded by adversarial examples, personal
and property safety protected by face recognition systemwill
be threatened.
In this paper, focusing on the safety of deep learning-
based image forensic algorithms, we first experimentally ver-
ify its vulnerability by adding noise to the clean images.
Specially, two different methods of generating adversarial
examples are referred, that is, adding perturbation in the di-
rection of the biggest change of the loss function or in the
direction of being classified as least-likely class. It should be
noted that, in order to simplify our discussion, the recaptured
image forensic scheme based on laplacian convolutional neu-
ral network, as a typical deep learning-based image forensic
scheme, is taken into account in this work. Then, in order to
resist against attack of adversarial examples, a penalty term
to the loss function is added which is the 2-norm of the gradi-
ent of the loss with respect to the input images, and an novel
training method is adopt to train the model by fusing the
normal and adversarial images. Experimental results show
that the proposed method has the advantages of safety and
achieve great performance in the cases of different methods
of adding noise with random strength.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, the structure of laplacian convolutional neural network is
briefly introduced. In Section 3, the vulnerability of deep
Copyright © 200x The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers
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Fig. 1 The explain of the fast change direction
learning-based method to adversarial examples is explained
and a safe CNN-based scheme to resist against attack of
noise is proposed. The experiment results are conducted in
Section 4, and conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. Previous Work
In this section we briefly introduce a deep learning-based re-
captured image forensic algorithm [1] which achieved state-
of-the-art performance. The architecture of the work include
two parts: single enhancement layer and general convolu-
tional neural networks structure. In the single enhancement
layer, laplacian filter was used to enhance the signal.
LF =

0, −1, 0
−1, 4, −1
0, −1, 0
 (1)
In the second part, the filtered images are fed into the
first convolution unit which includes: a convolution layer,
a batch normalization layer, relu function and an average
pooling layer. The later four convolution units have the
same composition as the first unit with only one difference
that the pooling layer in the fifth unit is replaced by global
average pooling. Finally, a full connection layer is used as
a classification layer. For more details, the kernels size of
convolution layer is 3 × 3 with 1 step size, and the kernels
size of pooling layer is 5 × 5 with 2 step size.
3. Proposed Method
Although image forensics schemes based on deep learning
have achieved exceptional performance, there still be a seri-
ous drawback. That is, images will be likely to be misclas-
sified if some noise is added onto the images in a particular
way. In this section, firstly, the vulnerability of the deep
learning-based image forensics algorithm is experimentally
verified. Then, two kinds of strategies which can resist noise
attack effectively to increase security of the deep learning-
based methods are present.
3.1 Vulnerability Analysis of Deep Learning-Based Image
Forensics
In the Figure. 1, suppose l(·) is the loss function and x is
an sample point that can be classified correctly. For a well-
trained model, l(x) is a relatively small values. If a slight
(a) ytrue : rec
ypred : org
prob = 100%
(b) ytrue : rec
ypred : org
prob = 100%
(c) ytrue : org
ypred : rec
prob = 100%
(d) ytrue : org
ypred : rec
prob = 99.9%
(e) ytrue : rec
ypred : rec
prob = 100%
(f) ytrue : rec
ypred : rec
prob = 100%
(g) ytrue : org
ypred : org
prob = 100%
(h) ytrue : org
ypred : org
prob = 100%
Fig. 2 The adversarial examples and their detection results
which is generated by FGSM with  = 1 using Yang’s and
proposed methods, respectively. (a) (b) (c) (d) is generated
and detected with Yang’s model. (e) (f) (g) (h) is generated
and detected with proposed model.
perturbation ∆x is added onto x along a particular direction,
the l(x + ∆x) will become a larger value, which means the
classification result will be changed with high possibility.
According to the above idea, two specific methods of
adding noise are used. For simplicity, the notations are as
follows:
• xclean - A normal image example, the pixels values of
which are integer numbers in the range [0,255].
• ylabel - True class for an image
• xadv - An adversarial example generated by some
method.
• L(x, y) - Loss function that used to train a neural net-
work.
• sign(x) - Sign function. sign(x) =

1, x < 0
0, x = 0
−1, x > 0
• clip(x,max,min) - Clip function.
clip(x,max,min) =

max, x > max
x, min < x < max
min, x < min
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) is to find the direc-
tion by making the partial derivatives of the loss by the input
image xclean. By adding noise on the clean image examples
along this direction, the loss will be changed most and the
probability of making a misclassification is the highest.
xadv =clip{xclean + sign(∂L(xclean, ylabel)
∂xclean
), 0, 255} (2)
Unlike the FGSM method using the true label to com-
pute the direction, Least-Likely Class Method (LLCM) use
the predicted label of the well-trained model to compute the
direction and hoping to make the noised images be classified
as the least likely class.
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Fig. 3 The architecture of Convolutional Neural Networks
used in this work
ymin = argy min{p(y |x)} (3)
xadv = clip{xclean − sign(∂L(xclean, ymin)
∂xclean
), 0, 255} (4)
There are some adversarial examples which are gener-
ated using FGSM with  = 1 in Figure. 2, and the upper
part is adversarial examples generated by Yang’s model and
corresponding detection results. And ytrue is the true la-
bel of each image, ypred is the predicted label, and prob
is the probability that the image is classified as predicted
label. One can be seen that the attack effect is so obvious
that slight noise can lead to incorrect classification with high
probability.
3.2 Secure Image Forensics Using Deep Learning
To counter against the threat of adversarial examples, we
proposed a secure deep learning method for image forensics.
The architecture of our CNN model is showed in Figure. 3.
The main idea is to make the loss relatively smooth on the
input images and their neighboring regions. Firstly, a penalty
term is added on the loss function which is the 2-norm of
the gradient of loss with respect to clean images. So the loss
function is shown as equation (5).
L(x, y) = J(x, y) + λ‖∇x J(x, y)‖2 (5)
where, λ is the weight coefficient and J is binary cross-
entropy:
J(x, y) = −
2∑
i=1
log( e
zi∑2
k=1 ezk
) (6)
where z is output of the last layer of the model.
This term can constraint the loss to be relatively smooth
so that not change too much when the input changes slightly,
which equals predictions will not change significantly.
Moreover, a novel training strategy is applied by fus-
ing adversarial examples and clean images together as
training set. Its process is as shown in Figure. 4,
for every mini-batch B = {x1, x2, x3, · · · xm} including m
clean images, the first k (k ≤ m) images are took out
Fig. 4 The process of training the model
and added noise. Then the rest clean images and the
noised examples are merged to a new mini-batch B′ =
{x1noise, x2noise, · · · xknoise, xk+1clean, xk+2clean, · · · xmclean}. And
when computing the loss of the new mini-batch, different
weights to the clean image loss Lclean and adversarial im-
age loss Lnoise are applied. The loss of one batch can be
computed:
Loss = Σi∈xclean L(xi, yi) + αΣi∈xnoise L(xi, yi) (7)
where, α is weight parameter. In our experiment, we
empirically set m=64, k=32, and α = 0.2.
Noted that for each step, only one method - FGSM is
used to generate adversarial examples with the loss of current
training phase. In order to ensure that proposed method can
be against various degrees of attack, adversarial examples
are generated using different strength  which is chosen in a
uniform distribution. By doing so, the model will converge
to a point where the loss is a relatively small value whether
the input is clean images or noised images. This equals
that the loss is relatively smooth in local neighborhoods of
training points.
The second row in the Figure. 2 shows the adversarial
examples generated by proposed model using FGSM with
 = 1 and corresponding detection results. It can be observed
that the proposed method can resist against the adversarial
examples’ attack effectively andmake a correct classification
with high confidence.
4. Experiments
In this section, firstly, the vulnerability of the original deep
learning scheme are evaluated by adding noise on the clean
image with two different methods. And then the safety per-
formance of proposed deep learning method to adversarial
examples are checked.
The images used in our experiment are exactly the same
as the work [1]. Four groups of datasets with size of 64×64,
128 × 128, 256 × 256 and 512 × 512 are used. Each group
has 10000 original images and 10000 recaptured images.
Then every group is divided into training set, validation set
and test set by percent 40/10/50. the batch size is set as
64 and iteration number is set as 100k. The initial learning
rate is 0.0001 and decays to 0.9 times every 10k iteration.
The noise strength  is chosen by a series of experiments.
Some attacked images are given in Figure. 5, (a) and (e) are
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(a) Clean(=0) (b) FGSM(=5) (c) FGSM(=10) (d) FGSM(=15)
(e) Clean(=0) (f) LLCM(=5) (g) LLCM(=10) (h) LLCM(=15)
Fig. 5 visual effect of images based on different attack
strength and different attack methods
clean images, and (b) (c) (d) are adversarial images generated
by FGSM with noise strength  = 5,  = 10,  = 15,
respectively, (d) (e) (f) are adversarial images generated by
LLCM. It can be found that the distortion of the images
become ever more obvious with the increase of the noise
intensity. While, slight noise ( ≤ 5) is hard to be observed.
So noise strength  is chosen in the range of [1.0, 5.0].
4.1 Experiment 1
In order to evaluate the vulnerability of Yang’s scheme to
adversarial examples. We first train laplacian convolutional
neural network model by Yang’ algorithm and generate ad-
versarial examples using two methods on our test dataset
which include 10000 images in one group of each size. The
detection accuracy for clean images is shown in Table 1 and
the classification accuracy of adversarial images is described
in the Table 2.
One can be seen from the Table 2 that these twomethods
are both effective in attacking the model trained by deep
learning basedmethods. FSGM is slightly better than LLCM
no matter what size of the images. And there is a tendency
that the bigger the image sizes are, the smaller gap between
FSGM and LLCM. This is because that LLCM use predicted
result to compute the gradient direction instead of the true
label, so better attack effect can be made when the model
can give more accurate result. And that is be proved in n
the work[1] that larger images can get higher classification
accuracy.
Another phenomenon need to be explained that the at-
tack effect is not always raised with the increase in noise
strength. We guess the reason is that the optimum point is
crossed when a relatively large noise strength is used.
4.2 Experiment 2
In this part, the attack effect of adversarial images to pro-
posed model are verified. For clean image, proposed method
does not affect the accuracy much. In Table 1, the accuracy
of clean images is displayed and it just has a slight and ac-
ceptable decline compared with Yang’s.
In the Table 3, detection accuracy of adversarial images
generated with two methods in different sizes are presented.
On can be seen that our method have a significant effect in
against of adversarial examples.
Note that we only inject FGSM adversarial examples
into our training set, so proposed model can be against the
FGSM noised examples very well. While LLCM adversarial
examples are generated in a different way, so the resistance
is not as great as FGSM.
Table 1 The accuracy of clean images in different sizes
image size 64 × 64 128 × 128 256 × 256 512 × 512
Yang 96.7% 98.2% 99.1% 99.4%
Prop 96.6% 98.1% 98.5% 99.0%
Table 2 Detection Accuracy of Adversarial Images for
Yang’s Method
size method  = 1  = 2  = 3  = 4  = 5
64 × 64 FGSM 2.8% 0.9% 0.5% 0.6% 2.6%
TGSM 7.5% 5.7% 5.2% 5.3% 6.9%
128 × 128 FGSM 1.1% 0.2% 1.4% 4.9% 6.5%
TGSM 2.9% 2.0% 3.1% 6.1% 7.5%
256 × 256 FGSM 2.6% 3.6% 5.4% 7.5% 9.9%
TGSM 3.9% 4.9% 6.6% 8.6% 11.1%
512 × 512 FGSM 3.3% 1.6% 0.9% 0.7% 1.0%
TGSM 4.6% 2.8% 2.2% 1.9% 2.1%
Table 3 Detection Accuracy of Adversarial Images for
Proposed Method
size method  = 1  = 2  = 3  = 4  = 5
64 × 64 FGSM 93.6% 94.5% 96.1% 96.3% 95.9%
TGSM 90.0% 91.6% 93.0% 93.3% 93.0%
128 × 128 FGSM 95.9% 97.1% 97.8% 98.4% 98.7%
TGSM 94.5% 95.6% 96.2% 96.8% 97.1%
256 × 256 FGSM 97.4% 98.5% 98.8% 98.9% 98.6%
TGSM 94.3% 95.1% 95.3% 95.4% 95.2%
512 × 512 FGSM 99.2% 99.3% 99.3% 99.4% 99.3%
TGSM 98.1% 98.2% 98.3% 98.3% 98.2%
5. Conclusions
Although lots of forensic methods based on deep learning
have achieved state-of-the-art performance, there is still a
defect that they are vulnerable to adversarial examples. To
against this potential threat, we propose a secure deep learn-
ing forensic method in which a penalty term is added to
the loss function and both normal images and adversarial
images are fused into training set. The effectiveness of pro-
posed scheme are evaluated by a set of experiments using four
different sizes of images and two different methods of gen-
erating adversarial examples with a series of noise strength.
Experimental results show that proposed scheme is effective
ZHAO et al.: SECURITY CONSIDERATION FOR DEEP LEARNING-BASED IMAGE FORENSICS
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to resist against the attack of adversarial examples.
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